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2ndLt D. A. Clark, 7th Marines COLONEL DeMUTH, Division Artillery Commander, Americal Division "The tactics and techniques of our artillery fire as taught by the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill are okay, and are good her on Guadalcanal. However, we have learned we have to fire 360 [degrees] here. Also, due to the way these Japs crawl around in the jungle, we have to pay more attention to the local security around our positions."
"Don't spare your artillery. Make the most of it. Every time you get enough information, even if the target is not profitable, get artillery fire on it. They hate it. "Try to get the Japs on the move; keep bouncing them around; don't let them get set. When you let them get set, they are hard to get out. We have had a great deal of success with 81mm mortar and with artillery fire. Here is an example:
"We have the Japs surrounded with their backs to the river. The 3 battalions were in close contact with the enemy. It was obvious that we had a large number of Japs surrounded and that the best way to get them out was to place field artillery and 81mm fire on them. However, the problem was to place the fire on the enemy and not on our own troops. "The movement we we executed was carefully coordinated with the artillery and with mortars. Each Battalion, at a certain time, was to withdraw just before the firing was due to start. We were very careful to explain to the men what we were doing so that they would not get a mistaken idea of the order for withdrawing. The maneuver was successful. Over 500 Japs were killed in this action. We had 44 Marines killed and 63 wounded. Our men were not hurt by the artillery and mortar fire, of course, but were killed and wounded in the fighting which took place before the withdrawal. After the firing ceased, we went in and mopped up in hand-to-hand fighting. "Our Battalion Commanders in the Seventh Marines know that in reporting information at once and, if they need help to ask for it and not just try to bull things through that they are enabling Regiments to act as a team, in the right manner and in the right direction. "I have a wonderful S-2 Section in this Regiment. I have been working with this 2 Section for over [two] years. I have been putting my best men in [the] 2 Section, and it has paid me. We insisted that the Battalions have good 2 Sections. You cannot do any better than your information. "Concentrate on communications. We depend to a large extent on wire communications. It is tough work, but it can be done. I have had to loan the Communications Regimental Section men to help carry wire through tough places, but I want communications. Your information has to be timely and properly evaluated. "A Regimental Commander cannot be impatient. Don't push your Battalion Commanders unless you feel there is a reluctance on their part. Our great leader, General Vandegrift, gives me a job and lets me handle the situation with a regiment in my own way. He is not impatient with me. Impatience would ruin the best plans. A mapped plan may not turn out to be feasible. So, we have learned here not to be impatient. "The forward observer of the artillery has furnished me with valuable information. Our system is to put the Artillery Observer Group with each battalion and keep the Artillery Liaison Officer with the Regiment. Are you teaching your Regimental Commanders to understand how to use artillery? "It has been impressed on us here that logistics have to be correctly planned. The science of logistics turns out to be your life. In this Regiment, I have a fine forceful Executive Officer, LtCol Frisbee. I use the Executive Officer in the rear echelon seeing that the S-4 functions and that supplies get up. Don't misunderstand me. The Executive Officer lets the S-4 run his job. He checks and aids him if he needs help. "Here is a thought I would like to leave with the Regimental Commanders. Pick your officers for common sense. Basic Field Manual knowledge is fine, but it is useless without common sense. Common sense is of greater value than all the words in the book. "I am [two] deep in my battalions in regard to Battalion Commanding Officers. That is, each one of my Battalion Executive Officers is a potential Battalion Commander. The reason for this is if the Battalion Commander gets killed or sick, I won't be caught out on a limb. "My Battalion Commanders use their Executive Officers in the same way I use my Regimental Officers. I back up my Executive Officer. I never see a Battalion Commander or a Staff Officer about administration unless they see the Executive Officer first. My Executive Officer and I are a team. He is responsible to see that my policies are carried out. I make my Staff Officers get out of this CP—not to snoop on the troops, but to help the battalions and acquaint themselves with the general situation. "Insist on night training, but don't train day and night. If I were training my Regiment again, working 7 days a week, I would train three nights and four days. "Our orders to our Marines on perimeter defense are, 'You stay in your position and do not pull back. If they bust through you, we'll plug up the hole, but you stay there.' Our Battalion Commanders have learned not to pull a company out of action to use it elsewhere. For example:
"If a company is need at point 'X' don't send any companies that have been committed at 'B,' 'C,' or 'D.' Send another company from somewhere else. If you make the mistakes of 'milling around,' as we call it, you will expend men's' lives. It is always expensive. I have never seen it fail to cost two times as much as the original commitment. "This Regiment can out-yell the Japs, out-fight them, out-bayonet them, and out-shoot them. This yelling, as in hand-to-hand action, is important. It is like a football team that talks it up. "The Japs yell at us, 'Marines, we're gonna keel you! More blood for the Emperor!' The Marines yell back, 'You [*#@*&%$#.] We'll kill all you Japs. More blood for Franklin!' "The Regimental Commander must make it his personal duty to watch and be greatly interested in sanitation. Because of our great interest in sanitation, our sick list is lower than normal. Our sick list runs lower than 40 men per battalion."
"In handling my companies I take the Company Commander's word for what is going on. You have to do this to get anywhere. In order to get a true picture of what is going on in this heavy country, I make my staff get up where the fighting is. This Command Post business will ruin the American Army and Marines if it isn't watched. Hell, our platoons and squads would like the command post in the attack if they are not watched! As soon as you set up a Command Post, all forward movement stops. "The 'walky-talky' the Japs have operates. Why can't we have a similar one? "To HELL with the telephone wire with advancing troops. We can't carry enough wire. We received an order. 'This advance will stop until the wire gets in.' THIS IS BACKWARDS!
"The staffs are twice as large as they should be. The Regimental staff is too large. I have 5 staff officers in this Battalion and I could get along with less. The officers have to dress and look like the men. One time the Commandant of the Marine Corps asked me why our patrol failed in Haiti. I replied, 'Because of the officers' bedding roll.' "In Haiti at that time the officer had to have a pack mule, and the enlisted men saw the officers lying around in luxury, etc. The patrols were actually held up for this pack mule. Your leaders have to be up front. Those that won't get up there, and are not in physical shape to keep up with the men, will cause plans to fail. "It is okay to say an outfit cannot be surprised, but it is bound to happen in this type of warfare; so, therefore, your outfits must know what to do when ambushed. "Calling back Commanding Officers to Battalion and Regimental CP's to say, 'How are things going?' is awful. A platoon of D Company is attached to each rifle company because of the heavy country. C Company watches the rear. Each company is responsible for its flank. This is a time-tested and proven formation which works. If attacked from a flank, face and adjust. "In marching or in camp, we have learned here that you must have an all-around defense. "We need more [e]ntrenching shovels. Give shovels to men who have wire cutters. You need both the wire cutters and shovels. "I wish we had the M1 rifle, and when we get relieved from Guadalcanal, I am going to make every effort to get it. "I consider it imperative that the Army and Marines be equipped with knee mortars and only carry one type of grenade. Have the hand grenade fit in the knee mortar and be of use as a hand grenade and also as a rifle grenade. You need a rifle grenadier in each squad for use against enemy machine gun nests." (Note: The following is the result of a conference with 5 of the best NCO's in the First Battalion of the Seventh Marines. The NCO's were selected by LtCol Puller.) "The Japanese fire is not always aimed. It is harassing fire and scares recruits. Get the recruits so they are used to overhead fire. Japs who have infiltrated signal to each other by the number of shots. We get these birds by constant patrolling. "The snipers tie their guns in the trees so they can't drop it carelessly or if wounded. In putting their light machine guns in the trees, they lash them in and have relief men ready to go up the tree. "Their machine guns don't traverse and search. "A Jap trick:"
"The mortar men thought they were safe. The Japanese let them fire two or three rounds. They cracked down, killed 3 and wounded 2. "The rifle grenade demoralizes the Jap. A Japanese prisoner told me in English, 'That 30 caliber cannon is terrible, sir." The Japanese sew grass and leaves to their shirts and hats. "They hit hell out of our points. They don't wait until they could get more men. They seek to delay us. When the point goes down, teach men to get behind big trees, if close, but not behind saplings. "If you shoot their officers, they mill around. Their NCO's are poor. You can tell they are officers by their sabers and leather puttees. "A lot of these Japs who infiltrate have radios. Think of this advantage in respect to artillery, mortar fire, location of troops, etc. My platoon found 9 Japs slipping behind our lines. (Note by LtCol Frisbee, Regimental Executive Officer: We have killed 38 Japs behind our lines during the period of August 7, 1942, to November 29, 1942.) "Their outpost at times is in trees. I saw one tree which was rotten inside. The Japanese had a light machine gun and a gunner down inside, and they had built a trap door on our side. Every once in a while, the door would open, and they would poke this machine gun out and fire. We took care of this. When we cease firing, they cease firing. When we fire, they open up. They do this to conceal their positions." LIEUTENANT SHEPPARD, Seventh Marines (Promoted on the field of battle) "Sir, how about training in the field with short rations? Put your patrols out from 3 to 5 days; every officer in the outfit to participate. If I were Commanding General of a training base, all people who miss one-third of the training would drop back to the next unit. "I believe that the units should have a minimum of 90 days training in jungle warfare. I would stress in this training teamwork between the leaders in all units. Liaison between support plans and all leaders. Liaison between artillery and infantry. "If I were training my unit again, I would really have some high-class patrol training. I would do everything with these patrols I could possibly think of to include losing them and making them go across country without maps or compasses. "The Japanese do a lot of yelling at times, and at other times are deadly silent. One night some Japanese got in our marching column. We discovered them and bayoneted them. At another time, I myself heard a Japanese yell in good English, 'K Company, forward!' The Japs don't like our men yelling back at them."
"I think this sniper business should be debunked. They hide under banyan trees and just poke their muzzle through a hole and fire indiscriminately. When the attack starts, they will come out. Those you bypass in the attack must be mopped-up later. "We learned not to get excited or go off half-cocked when there is a noise. The Japanese make noise to mislead us. They shot off some firecrackers at the start, but we have learned that where the noise is, he ain't. You never hear him move. He sleeps in the daytime and does his work at night. "It must be impressed and drilled into young soldiers not to throw away their equipment. Our young men did this at first, and we regretted it, as later we needed the equipment. We actually found some of our new equipment, which had been thrown away, in the hands of the enemy. "Some of our men got killed because they examined Jap mortar shells. There were hundreds of them shot at us which turned out to be duds. The recruits pushed the plungers. Result—instant death. "Officers and NCO's, during shelling, should move around and talk to the men. Quiet them down. If you don't do this, some of them will walk around with their fingers on their triggers and they get to imaging things. And along this line, we learned to post double sentinels—one man to quiet another. "We learned to dig small covered fox holes. Slit trenches are best. We had men smothered to death in too-large holes. Don't put more than 3 men in any hole unless the hole has a support on top big enough to stop a 500 pound bomb. "Teach the young fellows to look over the ground and look in the trees and to learn where the enemy probably will be. THE JAPS WILL BE IN THE TOUGHEST PLACES AND NATURALLY ON THE BEST GROUND. "All my time in the Marines I have seen men bunch up, and I have talked about this and make my NCO's talk about this all the time. The men seem to fear separation. "The BFM's state that a mortar round must not be opened until the round is ready to be fired. This, in my opinion, is impractical during the battle, because to deliver a large volume of fire, you have to have hundreds of rounds opened and prepared for firing. Some of the containers for the mortar rounds get wet and have to be cut in order to get the round out. This takes up time. "On occasion, it takes the entire ammunition squad and all available hands to cut open ammunition. Result may be, when 'Cease firing' is given you have numerous rounds open. These rounds, when exposed to the atmosphere, become wet or damp, making them dangerous to fire at a later time, because the increments won't burn uniformly and the round falls short. We have had a round fall as great as 600 yards short of delivery, firing at a range of 2700. I recommend that additional increments be issued in waterproof containers in order to remedy this condition. Also, we need additional cartridges for misfires. "The Japs are man-monkeys, and they run around considerable. In order to compete with these man-monkeys from Japan. you got to be in excellent shape and you got to be tough. We can lick them and we are doing it all the time, Sir. "I have seen some awful attempts at individual cooking. However, some of my men have got to the point where they can make jam tarts. "Sanitation—I know it's right! To violate it causes billions of flies and sickness. Some lousy undisciplined recruits defecated in fox holes, which caused trouble in the dark. We learned that individual cans should be buried. Some of the recruits threw the empty cans in the creek. Then, I heard that the next battalion came along and went in swimming and cut their feet. When you occupy a position for several days in the tropics, the sanitation problem becomes tremendous. The young officers and NCO's must get after this at the start and keep after it all the time."
"We insist on overhead cover for fox holes because of the Japanese mortar fire. In doing this you have to guard against the men building these fox holes up too high above the ground. "The other day we received a peculiar order which we carried out, but in which I did not believe. We were ordered to establish Platoon listening posts. In my opinion I thought this was in error, as the listening post should be either a squad or a company. The platoon was no good, as it was not strong enough. "Try to teach your men not to steal from each other and adjacent units. If you could do this, you will save yourself a lot of trouble."
"Give more attention to the training of the 81mm mortars, and the coordination of these weapons with the foot troops. We were too slow in getting the 81 into action when they were needed. Get 'em into action fast. "Be careful about withdrawing the men unless all men know what it is about. If you don't do this, you are liable to make the men panicky. "Now this next idea may sound strange to someone who may read your notes in an office far away, but it is a very practical means of controlling a march on a winding trail in this hot country. Marches here in the tropical jungle, where the air is hot and so steamy that there seems to be no air, takes a lot out of the men. "The weak ones will say, when the march gets tough,'hold it up!' As a result, this will be passed on up to the front and the column will stop where you don't want it to. So, as a result, we use the letter 'H' plus a numeral meaning to halt. The leaders and the point know what numeral we will use, and we change the numeral. For example we will use 'H2' the first two hours; then 'H7', etc. "We had an Army company of the -------- Infantry attached to my Battalion. They had heard so much about the Japs they were scared to death. Some of these men were sent out on a patrol and while on this patrol 2 were killed and 3 were wounded. Those not killed or wounded were in a terrible state of mind. They must learn to grit their teeth and bear it, and that we can and are beating the Japs. The Captain of this company was scared too. They had the wrong attitude. "I am screaming for gloves to use in handling barbed-wire. You cannot put up a barbed-wire fence in a hurry if you are barehanded. "You must realize that there is no such thing as not attacking when ordered to do so. We have got to get to the point where the men go ahead when ordered, and damn the hindmost. Corporals must be indoctrinated with leadership to overcome this, and all ranks have got to have the 'hate'. "We had a sad accident the other day. A man hung a hand grenade on a bandoleer. A vine pulled the pin—two men were killed. Empty bandoleers are okay in which to place hand grenades. We have had hand grenades left around at night. Then a Company, we will say, gets an order to move and hand grenades are lost. "We did not start taking quinine and atabrine soon enough when we hit Guadalcanal. We are paying for this now."
"The basic principle of leadership in the US Marine Corps is that the individual is told of his responsibility in different situations and is held to it. "You gotta have confidence in each other. When signals to move forward are given, you must have confidence that the men next to you will move forward even if you cannot see them. We have that kind of confidence in this Battalion. "We have developed signals in our Battalion which are not recorded in any textbook. I recommend that your troops do the same. "One night when we had a position on a steep ridge, the Japs attacked up the ridge. We pulled the pins of hand grenades and let them roll downhill. Don't forget to count 'one Jap dead, two japs dead' before throwing the grenade. We had a Marine killed in this Battalion because he forgot to count, and a Jap picked up the hand grenade and threw it back. "We love the heavy machine gun. The Thompson sub-machine gun or [the] carbine is needed, as they execute their attacks en masse. We understand the carbine will have more penetrating power than the Thompson. "We have two American Indians we use as 'talkers' on the telephone or voice radio when we want to transmit secret or important messages. "Don't forget the Japs make noise when they move too. They are not supermen. "Be mean and kill 'em. Kill 'em dead. Our motto in this Platoon is 'No Prisoners'."
"We have learned to make reconnaissance before moving into an area. We scout for ambushes. We have learned to be quiet, listen and look. I sure like to see that artillery come down on an area before we move into it. "The big problem which we have not solved completely yet to my mind is maintaining contact in the attack between units in this jungle, especially between battalions. "It takes guts to go up on the Japanese position to throw grenades and to attack. This reconnaissance, which is so important, is also hard work because the Japs move their defensive positions. "I was on my first patrol here, and we were moving up a dry stream bed. We saw 3 Japs come down the river bed out of the jungle. The one in front was carrying a white flag. We thought they were surrendering. When they got up to us, they dropped the white flag and then all 3 threw hand grenades. We killed 2 of these Japs, but [the third] got away. Apparently they do not mind a sacrifice in order to get information. They are tricky bastards. "The mortars are very effective here. An example: We were moving up a trail. We were stopped by machine gun fire. I withdrew the platoon and spread out off the trail, forming a skirmish line. I sent word back to the mortars to set up. They had to cut down some trees in order to set up properly. The [forward observer] comes forward and gets the azimuth and paces off the range as best he can. Then the mortars open up."
FIGHTING ON GUADALCANAL PART III
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