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Sgt C. W. Arrowood, F/164 MAJOR HENRY W. BUSE, JR., Assistant G–3 on General Vandegrift's Staff "We have had to multiply our unit of fire in hand grenades by five. The yellow color on hand grenades is poor. Why can't they be painted black, as the yellow color enables the Japs to throw them back. When we have taken a defensive position, as we have now to protect the airfield, due to the dense jungle we do not take up a formation which we would use on more open terrain, like terrain in the States. That is, here we generally do not establish strong points. We have a shoulder-to-shoulder defense with mobile reserves in the rear. "I am being sent back for a rest. We have been in action continually here from August 7, 1942 until this date—November 26, 1942. What we all marvel at is how much General Vandegrift can stand it so much better than we do. It must be his character."
"You asked about individual cooking. Yes, in my opinion the troops should know this, but it is not practical for units who are not close to water to cook that way, as they cannot clean their mess gear properly and dysentery is the result. These units put the 'C' ration—stew or bean—can to their mouth and eat that way. "You will notice as you go to the 164th Infantry that the Regimental Commander is relieving units who have been making it hot and heavy for the enemy, and also units who are on that ridge up there where there is no water and where the sun is beating down in that heavy thick tropical grass."
"If I could train my men over again, I would put officers and men in slit trenches and drop bombs nearby to overcome fear. We were all scared to death at first. Let's overcome this fear. How about firing some captured 25 caliber ammunition out of some captured rifles to let officers and men know the sound; also captured Jap machine gun ammunition out of captured machine guns. "We are learning to get shoes off men at night if the tactical situation permits. If I could train my Battalion again I would have some maneuvers in which things were made to go wrong—communications upset, etc., and I would observe which leaders are no good and replace them on the spot—not later. "I understand that in the U.S., troops in training for this type of warfare are practicing firing at short ranges. That is fine. "The Japanese powder is more smokeless than ours. We need smokeless powder." (Note: The reason the Japanese bullet, when it is fired, does not make as much smoke is probably because not as much powder is needed to send a 25 caliber bullet as is needed to send a 30 caliber bullet on its way.)
"train patrol in stalking certain positions. I consider this very important. If I were training my Battalion again, I would have training in patience. I would have patrols wait for the enemy to expose himself. They move around too. They have to relieve themselves and have to get food. I would have the men in this patience training be made to stay still for hours at a time. "We are not carrying mess kits—too bulky."
"When we first got here the Japanese fooled us as they like to place their machine guns on the reverse slope of the ridge, shooting upwards. "Our rifle grenades have been effective against hidden machine gun positions. You have to KILL these Japs before they will leave. Just turning a large volume of fire in his direction will not make him leave. "The time to have air observation is when we attack. At other times when our planes go over, the Japanese keep down and keep still."
"It is important that the entire squad know the BAR. Not just 2 men. Reason, think of the BAR men who are wounded, get killed, and become sick and have to be evacuated. "They don't appreciate the principle of reconnaissance here, or give us time for this very important thing. We must have time to do this as it saves lives and puts us in the proper position. "Our Battalion Pioneer Section must have better and more complete training in carrying food, water and ammunition and in cutting trails."
"Sir, are our men in the U.S. receiving individual training? I notice here that when I have to put 2 men out for say 48 hours, most of the men are upset unless they have an NCO along. For Pete's sake, sir, teach the men not to be 'trigger happy'. (Note: An expression used on Guadalcanal for men who are very nervous and who fire without seeing the enemy. This type of man is dangerous and has caused a lot of trouble. He has also given the position away.) "Are we getting a glass sight for the M1 for sniper work?"
"Every man should be equipped with a compass, and must know how to use the compass. The dumb bells who don't know how to use one have to be helped instead of being able to help themselves. Those who don't know how to use a compass can't help you or their NCO's. "I have been on 20 patrols in the last 40 days, and in most all of these patrols we went out from 2 to 5 miles. Getting communications back to the gun positions is an awful problem. Can you help us?"
I have been on 15 patrols, and each time a patrol war fired on, the man with a net on his helmet drew the fire. I have seen .25 caliber bullets go through our new helmet; so, as for me, I use a fatigue field hat. (Note: I talked to a man who showed me his steel helmet with a .25 caliber bullet hole in it. The man received a slight head wound. He was convinced, and so am I, that if he had not had on his steel helmet when the bullet was fired at him, he would have been killed.) "The Jap knee mortar gives us hell. They come in fast, thick and accurate. Can't we have one?" COLONEL B. E. MOORE, Commanding Officer, 164th Infantry (Note: When I saw Colonel Moore, he was interviewing a patrol and patrol leader who had just come back. They had been on a reconnaissance for 15 hours. The patrol leader had been met at an advance position, and, as he had valuable information, he was conducted by jeep to the observation post of the artillery, where he directed artillery fire; then returned to the Colonel where he made his report. The patrol and its leader were nearly exhausted. Colonel Moore had on hand small sample bottles of brandy which he issued one small sample bottle to each two men. He made them dilute the brandy with water in their canteen cups. It was noticeable that this helped them. The following interview took place after the patrol had been dismissed. One could not be with Colonel Moore for long without realizing that he is a leader and regimental Commander, in every sense of the word.) "The M1 rifle is a fine rifle. It is doing fine work here. "The greatest problem is leaders, and you have to find some way to weed out the weak ones. The platoon leaders who cannot command, who cannot foresee things, and who cannot act on the spur of the moment in am emergency are a distinct detriment. "It is hot here, as you can see. Men struggle; they get heat exhaustion. They come out vomiting, and throwing away equipment. The leaders must be leaders and they must be alert to establish straggler lines and STOP this thing. "The men have been taught to take salt tablets, but the leaders don't see to this. Result, heat exhaustion. "Most of the junior leaders have not used their heads at times. In their training, I recommend you out them up against situations where they MUST use their heads. For example, C. O. Company L reports he has only 35 men; that the rest have heat exhaustion. He did not have sense enough to rest his men, make then take salt, etc. "The good leaders seem to get killed; the poor leaders get the men killed. The big problem is leadership and getting the straps on the right people. "Not one man in 50 can lead a patrol in this jungle. If you can find out who the good patrol leaders are before you hit the combat zone, you have found out something. "I have had to get rid of about25 officers because they just weren't leaders! I had to MAKE the Battalion Commanders weed out the poor junior leaders. This process is continuous. Our junior leaders are finding out that they must know more about their men. "The good leaders know their men."
Dehydrated rations and type 'D' rations for the period expected. The following equipment: Good field glasses for all leaders down to sergeants in rifle units, and to squad leaders in weapons squads. "We need a rubber bag which will keep everything dry and can be used for floating contents across streams. Must be light and rugged. I also favor canvas leggings, greased shoes and hobnails for footing in climbing hills, a pair of flannel gloves for protection against insects while sleeping. officers and men must be in identical uniform."
"Our successful Commanders are invariably those who understand the use of infantry weapons. The work of our artillery has, I feel, been exceptional. Our forward observers have been right in the front line, and artillery fire has caused the enemy many casualties. "We feel that we have been successful. We have caused the enemy enormous losses in men. Our battle casualties to date exceed 3,500, of which about one-third have been killed in action. "Most of the fighting here has been carried out at extremely close range, and there has been as much throwing of hand grenades as in firing a weapon. No previous report, or even comment, on our enemy and our fighting has been made. For one thing, we did not want to appear boastful; for another, we have literally been so busy we have not had time to really think things out. "Concerning our enemy, several things are aparent. All his efforts have been in the form of attacks on a narrow front at rather widelt separated points. These wre mass attacks, and although orders and operations maps captiured have shoiwn they were to be simultaneous attacks, this was never the case. Our feeling is that his failure to estimate the terrain difficulties caused the lack of coordination. The result has been favorable to us, as it has permitted the shifting of our all to small reserves from one area to another. "We believe that the enemy has dispersed his efforts and has therefore failed to make any gain at one point. When given his choice, he operates exclusively at night. As I said before, he attacks on a very narrow front, practically en masse. This leads to many 'purple nights' when we watch longingly for sunrise. The result for him has been almost complete annihilation in every case. As far as we can determine, these various attacking groups are started out, and there are indications that they pass out of real control of their higher leaders. We have never seen anything to indicate that any effort has been reinforced after the initial push has been made. "The Japanese soldiers fight with a sort of fanaticism and never surrender. We have taken practically no prisoners. Officers about to be taken prisoner sometimes commit suicide. Perhaps the greatest assistance to us has been captured orders and maps. A great deal of information has been gotten from captured diaries. Our interpreters on the spot were able to get from captured orders information on which we have successfully operated at once. It causes me to never want to write another order. "The Japanese try all the tricks, make all of the noises, and infiltrate as many snipers as is reported they did in Bataan and Malaya. These things have little effect on good troops who hold their positions, which they can do with safety and fight them when they come up. So far as I have been able to determine, though we have had hundreds of snipers in our position, only one man has been killed by a sniper. We usually get every one of them. Don't worry about them. They are ducks on the pond when daylight comes. "In their air attacks and in their ground operations, the Japanese appear to follow very definite patterns/ Each attack appears to be the same. They are easily disconcerted by surprise, and if they fail to succeed in what is apparently the only way they know how to fight, they become ineffective. We have carefully avoided night attacks, making all of our offensive moves by day. Our officers feel that the Japs have placed so much stress on night fighting that they cannot or do not fight well at all in the daytime. "Our officer casualties have been high, because it is necessary for the officer to be practically in the firing line in jungle fighting; otherwise he loses control. We have lost a number of Company Commanders and quite a few Battalion Commanders. We have managed to keep up our officer replacement by field promotions of selected noncommissioned officers who have proven themselves in battle. It is not likely that the Division will receive any officers no matter how long it may operate. "This account is hasty, disconnected and rambling, but I have attempted to get down just a few of the points on which I believe we have some conclusion." Digest of Lessons Learned in Tactics of Jungle Warfare as a result of interviews which are attached: 1. Troops must receive a high degree of individual training to prepare for jungle warfare. The individual in combat will be required to act on his own a large part of the time. This is due to the dense foliage. However, individuals must feel the very presence of their squad leaders and other leaders, and know that they are important members of a team which can lick the enemy. The leaders must take pains to carefully explain to the privates what their responsibilities are, and what is expected of them in each situation. Furthermore, weak individuals who cannot be trusted to act correctly without supervision must be weeded out. preferably before they arrive in the Combat Zone. Individuals must have thorough practice in throwing hand grenades in woods. They must reach a much higher degree of proficiency in the art of camouflage. This will require constant application in the training period. By realistic training a large amount of fear can be overcome in the individual. he should know before he reaches the Combat Zone what it feels like to have bombs explode near him, what a sniper's bullet sounds like, and what overhead machine guns and artillery fire sound like. The prowess of the enemy must NOT be overemphasized. American Soldiers and marines can whip the Japs and they are doing so every day. Many men stated that they had been talked to so much about the Japanese snipers that at first they were afraid. Individual riflemen must know the tactical relationship between the machine gun and their rifle in order to be able to act intelligently. Training in observing and firing at vague targets must be emphasized. 2. In training, scouting and patrolling must be emphasized. Major General Vandegrift, Commanding the 1st Marine Division, states that jungle warfare against the Japanese is a question of going back to the tactics of the French and Indian days, with these tactics adjusted to fit in with our modern weapons. Men should receive training in patience. Our national character is foreign to this idea. We are an impetuous people. Training in patience is needed as sometimes the men will be required to remain motionless and quiet for hours at a time. 3. Not every man can lead a patrol successfully in the jungle. The good patrol leaders should be discovered in the training period. In training, patrols should be sent out for 10 to 15 hours at a time. Due to the slow way in which a patrol moves, it is necessary to keep patrols out for long periods of time. The problem of getting communication back from the patrol to friendly territory in the jungle is a hard one. It must be made easier by training. Patrols should be confronted with unusual situations. 4. The Japanese knee mortar is needed. An all-purpose hand grenade, which, in additon to being used as a hand grenade, can be used in the knee mortar and as a rifle rgenade, should be adopted. Mortar squads must learn to set up quickly and be able to operate in wooded terrain. 5. All units must receive practice in the problem of maintaining contact in the advance in the jungle. 6. In the following interviews there are many remarks on leadership. The leadership shown by the 5th and 7th Regiments of the U.S. Marines stands out because of their great wealth in experienced officers and NCO's. On the other hand, the remarks of Colonel B. E. Moore, Commanding Officer of the 164th Infantry, emphasizes the greta problems in the leadership which confronted a partially trained regiment which had been rushed to the Combat Zone. END
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