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Below is a copy of "Notes on Japanese Tactics in the Solomons", a typewritten document prepared by the 3rd Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division. It is likely that this document was written while the battalion was serving in the Defense Force, Wallis Island, prior to deploying to Guadalcanal in mid-September 1942. The author is anonymous, but it is likely that officers in the battalion intelligence and operations sections collaborated in the preparation. The original document used for this page has a handwritten note at the top: "Return when read & passed [to] the squad." (Note: The document makes little or no use of paragraphs. I have inserted them at logical spots in the text for ease of reading. MF)
FLEET MARINE FORCE Notes on Japanese Tactics in the Solomons: The main characteristics of Japanese jungle-fighting and it cannot be otherwise defined-in the Solomons were: A. Extreme cunning - amazing ability in individual concealment and stealthiness in movement. Going into some detail on these characteristics: A. Extreme cunning - The mere fact that an assault unit of Marines had passed over a particular piece of terrain gave little or no protection for supporting and rear elements. Japs would conceal themselves in holes or depressions in the ground, apparently not big enough to hold an infant - and pull a rock or bush down over them. Marines would move by; the Japs would arise, take a potshot and duck again. This sort of thing can be handled only by assault groups ruthlessly checking every probable, possible, or suspected hiding place in their zone of action, being ready to destroy hidden Japs instantaneously. In addition, special and supporting weapons groups must not only be prepared to support company or battalion missions, as the case may be, but must supply their own local security as if they themselves were an assault squad. This holds as fully for reserve and support elements, command post and rear echelon groups. Keep on your toes every minute. Other instances of similar sort would prove interesting. A group of Marines approached what appeared to be the bodies of dead Japanese. They turned one "corpse" over. As they did so the "corpse" let go with two hand grenades, killing or wounding most of the Marines in the vicinity as well as doing away with himself. Moral: Whenever possible a couple of rounds for "confirmation" or for "effect" will never be considered a waste of ammunition. Marine landing forces were supported by powerful and extremely effective naval and air bombardment which apparently laid waste [to] whole islands or important parts of them. Nevertheless, on hitting the beach the Marines discovered that the Japs were still shooting, in many cases. In tunnels, in natural caves [and] in fissures they had hidden until the bombardment ceased. Then they thought the time was right to catch Marine landing groups "off guard" - out they came. The concealment of snipers was particularly effective. Almost any tree with the slightest bit of foliage on it could be considered a hiding place of a Jap sniper, usually lashed into the upper branches. Ambushes, both successful and attempted, by concealed Japanese on Marine units in the assault, or support elements, occurred frequently. A unit, no matter of what size, cannot afford to assemble, or cease movement unless in an area they have definitely ascertained to be cleared of Japanese. At no time should the rigid adherence to the basic principles of patrolling and security be relaxed. In one instance, the failure of a unit to provide any security or reconnaissance to the front, preparatory to moving the main body across a dangerous area, resulted in almost 100% casualties by enemy machine gun fire. A divisional staff officer was killed in [the] ambush. (Note: This is probably a reference to the Goettge Patrol. MF) Operations by small groups - In line with what has been noted above, it can be seen that the enemy's refusal to present an integrated front against Marine landing attack units, prevented closely coordinated action by units above platoon, or even squad-size against Japanese positions and infiltrating groups. This obviously had the result of allowing small Japanese groups to operate against, and harass successive waves of the Marine landing forces after the assault troops had passed on. To slow up the assault elements in order to completely prevent such enemy counter-infiltration, or to thoroughly exterminate isolated and hidden groups would have been playing into the hands of the Japanese defenders. Thus, it must be impressed on all hands who may be in the supporting waves or in the rear echelons, that their responsibility to continue action against Japanese ambush groups, snipers, and concealed gunners is fully as great, if not greater, than those ahead. In place of the classic picture of a battalion in attack as shown below:
Small unit actions, mopping-up jobs, [and] anti-sniper activities will be occurring simultaneously throughout the depth of the attacking battalion. A gunner serving a pack howitzer 3000 yards in the rear of an assault squad in "K" Company must be on the alert to use his rifle, pistol, or bayonet on a concealed Jap, just as a rifleman in that assault squad must be. C. Desperation - Why was there such a violent fight in view of the fact that the Japs were poorly armed, and definitely outnumbered by the Marines? The little yellow men fought with knives when there were no other weapons for them; waited for casualties (both Japanese and ours) to retrieve weapons - and when even these were gone, fought with their bare hands. Even when this was denied to them, they hid, refused to surrender - and died. Where a group would appear willing to surrender, the sight of one or a few of the group holding a hand grenade in an upraised hand would prove rather disconcerting to the potential Marine captors - who invariably played it safe after a few of these incidents. This had the effect of materially reducing the number of Japanese prisoners. In other instances individuals and groups swam by night from one island to another, armed only with knives. They attempted harassing actions, ambushes, throat-slitting - anything that would slow up or hinder United States operations. As Marine landing forces overran various islands, it became necessary to follow different types of mopping-up procedures: That of destroying Japs cornered or penned-up in such manner that there was no chance for them to do further damage or to escape - [y]et who refused to surrender. At one point a small group of enemy were driven to take cover under the ledge of an overhanging cliff. They were completely surrounded [and] no chance for their escape existed. They refused, however, to surrender. In the end they were destroyed by a TNT demolition swung over the edge on a long line attached to a pole. In another case, seven Japanese attempting to hide were so crowded into a small cave that only one man in the lot was able to move a muscle. Surrender? No! It was necessary to slaughter them on the spot. At another point, a Jap forced into the open ran out of his hiding place, laughing as he cut his own throat. D. Savagery - Numerous cases of unnecessary killing and mutilation on the part of the Japanese defenders of the Solomons have been reported. Completely cunning treacherous in their desperate stand, as has been pointed out, their bloodthirstiness should be discussed also. The mutilation and beheading of wounded and corpses was also reported early in the action. As rumors of this sort of thing traveled through the Marine units fighting ashore, reprisals began occurring on a large scale. Japanese flushed from cover were not merely shot down; they were ventilated thoroughly by all the small-arms fire in the vicinity. A Jap who still had a spark of life in him was considered "still dangerous" and ruthlessly destroyed. The Marines learned their lessons well. "There are no good Japanese - not even dead ones." Fire must be fought with fire. Conclusions - The information at hand is far too meager, and the actions discussed much too recent, for any generalizations or predictions to be made. Read the above paragraphs for what they represent - a collection of reliably reported incidents and first-hand stories from which some clues can be obtained. Every officer and man asks the question: Can we, with our type of training and background, handle the Jap fighter? The answer is an emphatic YES. Troops far less experienced than we are were able to do it. You must remember that, in spite of the cleverness, skill, and ferocity of the enemy it was the United States Marines who were fighting and winning in the Solomons. The Marine, not the Jap, is the better man. The men who fought in the Solomons have added brilliance to the already shining name of the Corps; we cannot do else but follow in the same bright pattern.
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