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The 27th Marine Regiment was a shadow of the powerful force that assaulted Iwo Jima’s beaches on D-Day. Every unit in the regiment, most importantly the infantry battalions, desperately needed to replenish and reconsolidate. After battering themselves against the reinforced Japanese defenses, the surviving Marines were worn almost beyond endurance. Many of the regiment’s Marines—too many—now rested beneath wooden crosses, or waited silently for graves registration teams to police them from the battlefield. On the next day, D+11, elements of the 26th and 28th Marines completed the final destruction of the Japanese defenses on and around Hill 362A. The 5th Marine Division had paid dearly for every yard captured. Since the D-Day landing, the division had suffered 1,000 Marines killed, 3,244 wounded and 49 missing. The 3rd and 4th Marine Divisions fighting in other sectors had endured similar casualty rates. A trickle of replacements made their way to the frontline units. The 27th Marines Action Report would later make note of this: “The replacements were certainly totally unsatisfactory. Replacement personnel come for the most part from shore party personnel. They were supplied either in driblets or in groups of approximately 100 men. The officers for the most part did not know the men and they certainly knew very little, if anything, about combat.” (1) These young men were faced with the daunting task of surviving in one of the most rugged battles of World War II. They were loyal, and did their duty the best they knew how. Many of them paid for the shortcomings in the replacement system with their lives.
Most of the company leaders had been either killed or wounded. The battalion staff sections were also operating at reduced efficiency because of casualties. For example, 1stLt James Rain operated as the adjutant, and intelligence officer. Casualties in the administrative section made normal reporting impossible, which caused major problems tracking the whereabouts and status of the battalion’s Marines. (2) On 1 March, LT 1/27 went into an assembly area near a crossroad about 500 yards northwest of Motoyama Airfield #2. The battalion spent what passed as a quiet day on Iwo Jima. They ate hot 10-in-1 rations, cleaned weapons, and had mail call. Most importantly, they took advantage of the chance to sleep. But the battle was never far away. The next day, the battalion received orders to provide defensive support for the 26th Marines. The Marines saddled up and moved to a road junction about 400 yards to the west and occupied the area for the night.
The Vth Amphibious Corps was pushing hard against the toughest portion of the Japanese defenses. In this bewildering and jumbled moonscape, each draw and ravine held a reinforced position that interlocked with other defenses. Artillery, close air support and naval gunfire were employed for massive preparatory
On D+12 (3 March) LT 1/27 was attached to the 26th Marines at 1030. Baker Company went to LT 2/26 in the fight for Hill 362B to help relieve pressure on the 3rd Marine Division. In combat with hand grenades, flamethrowers and bazookas, 2/26 advanced 600 yards against fierce resistance. After the battle Baker was released back to battalion control. The rest of the battalion remained in the assembly area. That night, Japanese infiltrators were active throughout the 26th Marines sector and over 100 were killed.
The next day was unseasonably warm, with low, overhanging clouds and intermittent showers. LT 1/27 was assigned to the right flank of the 26th Marines’ sector. Under heavy mortar fire, the line companies moved to about 500 yards northeast of the unfinished Motoyama Airfield #3. The battalion sector was wide enough for only one company. Charlie went first and the attack kicked off at 0800. The attack on D+13 ground forward yard by bloody yard. In a process that repeated itself over and over, platoons advanced cautiously using whatever cover and concealment was available. Once the enemy opened fire and exposed his location, infantry Marines laid down covering fire to maneuver a demolition team and flamethrowers forward. These fearsome weapons would then destroy the position, usually a reinforced cave mouth.
Pfc Wesley Eagle, from Onamia, Minn., first distinguished himself on 4 March during the fighting north of Motoyama #3. As a BAR man and fireteam leader in Charlie Company, Eagle boldly led his Marines in an assault to divert attention from litter teams recovering wounded Marines in his pinned down platoon. Although he was severely wounded in this action, Eagle refused evacuation since he was the only BAR man left in his platoon. While delivering covering fire for his fellow Marines, Eagle was wounded a second time, but remained in position until all the wounded Marines had been pulled off the exposed ground. (3) LtCol Butler pulled Charlie out of the line at 1600 due to heavy casualties and Baker Company moved up in relief. The attack continued at a snail’s pace under extremely heavy fire. By 1800, the Marines had secured 100 yards of hard won ground. The battalion halted in place for the night on a nameless piece of ground. That night, LtCol Butler penned a hasty letter to Honey Gal, only his second since the start of the campaign. He wrote that he was sitting in “one of Tojo’s caves,” and that he had lots to say that he couldn’t write in a letter. (4) The entire 5th Marine Division was ordered to use the next day, 5 March 1945, to reorganize and reconsolidate. Huge gaps had been torn across the ranks and there was no way to make up the losses. Division headquarters rated combat effectiveness at 40%. On D+13 (5 March) LT 1/27 was detached from the 26th Marines and reverted back to its parent unit. During the morning elements of LT 1/26 moved up and took over the battalion’s sector. The line companies hiked back to an assembly area about 400 yards northwest of Motoyama village. Road Junction 338 was located near the assembly area. This junction was on the main supply route for the 26th Marines and other units in the 5th Marine Division’s northeast sector.
About 1300, LtCol Butler mounted his jeep to head back to the regimental command post. With him were his driver, Pfc Stanley Barnett, and his radio operator. As the jeep bounced across country just west of the road junction, a Japanese 47mm antitank gun in the 3rd Marine Division sector fired. Struck by a direct hit, the jeep was destroyed, wounding the two enlisted Marines. LtCol John Butler was killed instantly. For his heroism leading LT 1/27 during the Iwo Jima campaign, the skipper would receive a posthumous Navy Cross.(5) Pfc Chuck Tatum, B 1/27, remembered the reaction: “The word about [LtCol Butler’s] death swept through the ranks of the 1st Battalion like a wildfire. It was whispered from position to position. Those bastards got the Colonel! The news was a shock. A stillness fell on the battalion. The loss of LtCol Butler was hard to take. If the leader has fallen, who will be next? Morale was affected. LtCol Butler was an admired and respected officer and leader of men.”(6) Doctor James Vedder, battalion surgeon of 3/27, related the following conversation with his commander, LtCol Donn Robertson, about LtCol Butler's death: "While the coffee was brewing on our Coleman stove, Colonel Robertson stopped in for one of his routine visits. As he settled slowly to the ground to accept a cup of hot coffee, he appeared both weary and worried. His usual calm self-assurance seemed shaken for the first time.
The battalion was committed to the attack again northeast of Hill 362B n D+18 (9 March). In a column of companies, Charlie Company took the lead, followed by Baker. The enemy had every yard zeroed in with heavy weapons and seemed to have a plentiful supply of knee mortar rounds.
Returning back to Charlie’s lines, Julian found more satchel charges. With another Marine, he destroyed two cave positions by sealing them with explosives. One pillbox remained from the cluster. Julian got a bazooka from another Marine and, acting alone, fired four rounds into the pillbox, destroying it. Mortally wounded by enemy small arms fire, Julian fell on the battlefield. For his heroic actions that saved the lives of many Marines, PltSgt Julian was later awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor. (8) That afternoon, LtCol Duryea was severely wounded in a landmine explosion. Upon his evacuation the executive officer, Maj William Tumbleston, took command of LT 1/27. In a day of hard fighting the battalion advanced 100 yards and dug in for the night on exposed terrain. The next day (D+19) the dogged assault continued. The Marines were stalled by very heavy point blank fire and had to wait until 0900 for tanks to show up. The companies shifted in sector to cover an open right flank but couldn’t make any appreciable gains. During this battle, Charlie Company drew the mission to knock out an 8-inch gun and supporting pillboxes. Pfc Wesley Eagle was in the thick of this fight. He led his fireteam around to the flank of a pillbox. Hit by enemy fire and mortally wounded, Eagle died while his Marines reduced the position. He later received a posthumous Navy Cross for his heroism on 4 and 10 March 1945. (9)
D+20 (11 March) was a repeat of the previous days. The entire 27th Marine Regiment, with LT 1/26 attached, launched a regimental attack on the right flank of the 5th Marine Division sector. Just prior to the attack friendly artillery fired a heavy concentration into the battalion’s position, causing numerous casualties. The assault companies kicked off the attack on schedule at 0830. On the right, Baker Company gained 350 yards against fierce opposition in heavily broken sandstone draws. On the left however, Charlie could only advance 100 yards against point blank, heavy machine gun fire. During this action and on subsequent days a tank platoon, a flame tank and a tankdozer were attached to the battalion. Maj Tumbleston gave the order to halt and straighten the lines at 1800.
Notes for cited material: (1) Information on the replacement problem extracted from 27th Marines Action Report, Annex ROGER, page 8
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